Bosnia’s ‘Second Collapse’ is Starting to Look Inevitable

Bosnia’s ‘Second Collapse’ is Starting to Look Inevitable

Timothy Less

BIRN

February 28, 2020

As the external scaffolding propping up a united Bosnia falls away, Serbian threats to secede from it have never looked so realistic.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is heading for its second collapse, three decades after the independent state first disintegrated, at the moment of its birth.

The trigger is the ruling of Bosnia’s Constitutional Court, that publicly owned agricultural land in the Republika Srpska, RS, is the property of the Bosnian state rather than the RS itself, a decision which undermines the Serbs’ claim on their territory. The ruling followed an appeal by Bosniak parliamentarians, which passed with the support of the non-Serb members of the nine-judge panel, including three foreign judges.

The Serbs claimed the decision was political and, in response, the Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, backed by Republika Srpska’s parliament, the Serbian Orthodox Church and much of the electorate, has issued an ultimatum to the Bosniaks: agree to the removal of the foreign judges from the Constitutional Court within 60 days or the RS will unilaterally restore its full autonomy and initiate a referendum on independence. In the meantime, the RS parliament has called on Bosnian Serbs not to participate in state institutions, rendering them ineffective.

 It is easy to dismiss this as yet another empty threat in a succession of rhetorical demands by Dodik for the Republika Srpska’s independence, dating back to the mid-2000s. Instead of ignoring the Constitutional Court ruling, as he is free to do, Dodik is distracting Bosnian Serbs from their economic hardships by manufacturing a crisis, then reaping the rewards in local elections due in October.

However, this analysis misses the broader strategic picture – that the external scaffolding supporting the Bosnian state has all but collapsed, creating circumstances in which the RS can break away from Bosnia.

Battle of wills that began at Dayton:

Signing the Dayton Agreement. Photo: Wikimedia commons/NATO

In common with other secessionist groups, the Bosnian Serbs view themselves as a separate political community whose interests are irreconcilable with those of the majority group, the Bosniaks. In the early-1990s, they fought a war not to be part of the newly independent state of Bosnia and the reason they remain in the country is only because they failed to win this war outright. Instead, the conflict ended with a reluctant compromise, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, in which Bosnian Serbs gained far-reaching autonomy but within a formally unified Bosnian state.

This triggered a short-lived internecine dispute between Serb hardliners who rejected Dayton because it conceded too much and moderates who accepted Dayton because it gave the Bosnian Serbs de facto independence. The second camp prevailed, spearheaded by Dodik, who argued that Bosnian Serbs should give their consent to the Bosnian state on the terms set out in Dayton.

However, the settlement was unacceptable to most Bosniaks who refused to cede control of territory they considered an integral part of their homeland and on which they had lived in large numbers until they were brutally expelled during the war.

Over time, the West also cooled on the Dayton settlement because its multiple layers of government led to serious inefficiencies and its complex system of checks and balances, including ethnic quorums and national vetoes, allowed groups with divergent interests to block decision-making in the shared institutions.

That posed an insurmountable obstacle to Bosnia’s integration with the EU and NATO, the Europeans’ and Americans’ exit strategy from the country. As a consequence, in the late-1990s, the West awarded itself powers to reform the institutions of state, transferring competencies from lower levels of government to central institutions and limiting the right of national groups to block legislation.

However, the Serbs never accepted these reforms, which were imposed under duress. When the West eventually released its grip on Bosnia in 2006, and politics was again domesticated, Dodik started demanding a restoration of the earlier settlement, backing it up by threats of secession.

Unsurprisingly, the Bosniaks refused and have instead used all available political, legal and diplomatic means to continue the process of centralisation, which the West began. In turn, the Serbs have resisted this, leading to an agonising battle of wills that has retarded Bosnia’s political, social and economic development.

The Bosniaks cannot win this battle because the basic balance of power on the ground favours those who want to break the Bosnian state rather than those who want to make it. The Bosniak goal, of establishing a democratic, multi-ethnic society, requires the active cooperation of the Serbs and Croats, and both groups are withholding this.

But the Serbs do not need the cooperation of the Bosniaks for their plans. If the Bosniaks refuse to restore the original Dayton settlement, the Serbs have the option of unilaterally detaching their territory from Bosnia and uniting it with their mother state across the border. At some point, Dodik concluded that, if the Serbs cannot live in Bosnia on the terms set out in Dayton, by consequence they must leave.

Outsiders, not Bosniaks, are the Serb’s main obstacle:

NATO flag. Photo: EPA-EFE/Toms Kalnins

In contrast to other secessionist disputes, the main constraint on the eventual Serb secession move has not been the opposition of the majority group, since the Bosniaks are too weak and divided to hold the Bosnian state together by force, but the opposition of outsiders, whose actions have rendered RS independence all but impossible.

The United States, the ultimate guarantor of security in the Balkans, has maintained an implicit threat of punishment against the Serbs, including physical attack, if they attempt to secede.

Russia, traditionally the Serbs’ main external sponsor, has opposed any breakup of Bosnia, initially because of its desire for good relations with the West and later because it wanted the Bosnian Serbs to stay put and block NATO membership for the whole of the country.

Meanwhile, the Europeans offered the Balkan countries the chance to become EU members, with all the benefits that this implied – stability, good governance, prosperity and national unification within a borderless union – in return for abandoning nationalism and adopting a Western political and economic model.

The EU’s offer had little impact in Bosnia, where politics remained fixated on the primary questions of population, borders and sovereignty. However, first Croatia and then Serbia accepted the Brussels’s proposal, and subsequently repudiated the secessionist ambitions of their compatriots in Bosnia.

This constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the Bosnian Serbs’ and Croats’ goals, because they relied on their mother states to support them, politically, financially and, if necessary, militarily following any break from the rest of Bosnia.

In a further complication for the Serbs, Serbia itself was forced last decade into a struggle with the US and others to retain its sovereignty over the former province of Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008. As a matter of principle, Belgrade could not simultaneously oppose the partition of Serbia along national lines, and support partition in Bosnia. Nor could Serbia afford to alienate the US, which ultimately held the key to Kosovo’s future, by jeopardising Washington’s Bosnian state-building project.

Window of opportunity for Serbs has opened:

Milorad Dodik in Belgrade, Serbia. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC

However, the position of these various external actors changed decisively in the second half of the last decade, creating a window of opportunity for the Serbs to make a break.

Most importantly, the US made three key innovations to its policy. The first was to end its threat of physical attack on the Serbs, although, in truth, this shift was a long time coming. The risk to the RS fell dramatically with the withdrawal of US forces from Bosnia in 2006. By the time of Barack Obama’s presidency, aversion to overseas military interventions meant the threat was largely theoretical.

However, the risk was all but eliminated with the election of Donald Trump and his rejection of “stupid wars” in peripheral regions like the Balkans. Questioned about Montenegro’s membership of NATO, Trump asked why he should deploy American forces to a “tiny country” with “very aggressive” people.

In theory, the US could still impose a lesser punishment on the RS, such as sanctions. But Washington has already enacted a travel ban and asset freeze on Dodik, to little avail, and the White House is unlikely to advocate economic sanctions on a population that is acting peacefully and poses no direct threat to the US.

The second innovation in American policy is its decision to fight the “New Cold War” in the Balkans, following the escalation of tensions with Russia, which the US now sees as the primary threat to the region’s stability. Following successes in Montenegro and North Macedonia, the US is now focused on neutralising Russia’s influence in Serbia, by getting it to recognise Kosovo and resolving the issue that gives Russia leverage over Serbian foreign policy.

That has led to the third innovation – the end of Washington’s commitment to upholding multi-ethnicity in the Balkans, following its agreement to the partition of Kosovo. In part, this is a matter of practicality: Washington now accepts that if Serbia is to recognise Kosovo, it will need something in return, such as the Serb-dominated north of the country. It is also a matter of ideology: as a nationalist, Trump has little interest in multiculturalism and, as a disruptor, he cares nothing for preserving the reputations of officials in the State Department invested in the success of a multi-ethnic Bosnia.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the EU has withdrawn its earlier offer of membership for the Balkans because of the growing resistance of powerful EU members to the region’s integration.

France is the main opponent because it believes that eastward enlargement weakens the EU, and France’s position within the EU, and upsets the delicate balance of power between France and Germany, the main beneficiary of enlargement. Significantly, France has a democratic mandate for its stance because a majority of European citizens also oppose the integration of the Balkans due to its association with immigration, organised crime and political instability.

Until 2018, Paris toed the EU line on enlargement to avoid a dispute with Germany and the UK, both supporters of the policy. However, with Germany politically paralysed and the UK gone, France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, is now free to block the EU’s expansion into the Balkans.

French President Emmaneul Macron. Photo: EPA-EFE/STEPHANIE LECOCQ

Formaly, Macron has not imposed an absolute veto on enlargement, and will probably allow the process to proceed in bureaucratic terms on the basis of a new, stricter methodology. However, a succession of public comments by Macron in recent weeks makes it clear that France does not want the Balkans to join the EU, and the new methodology will allow Paris to string the accession process out indefinitely.

These international developments have inevitably had consequences for Serbia’s regional policy. Washington’s decision to neutralise Russian influence in the country has significantly strengthened Belgrad’s position since it is in Serbia’s gift to decide whether or not to end its relationship with Russia and, by extension, whether US policy succeeds or not. Meanwhile, France and others have removed the main incentive for Serbia to abandon nationalism in pursuit of an alternative future inside the European Union.

Predictably, Belgrade has responded by reviving its historic goal of establishing a Serbian national state. If EU membership is off, Serbia has nothing to lose by redirecting its energies towards the unfinished business of the 1990s. At the same time, Serbia is able to leverage the US into supporting its plans, by making this the condition for Serbia’s support for Washington’s own plans.

That has already forced the US into agreeing to Belgrade’s demand for a partition of Kosovo along national lines. However, this is unlikely to be the only item on Serbia’s wish list, because most Serbs outside Serbia live in Bosnia.

For now, Belgrade is refraining from making explicit claims on the RS. It does not want to open up the Bosnian question just yet because it needs Washington’s help with partitioning Kosovo. However, at some point, the issue will become unavoidable, as the Belgrade government will have to gain the Serbian people’s consent for recognition of Kosovo, and they will demand compensation in kind, which will have to be the RS.

As for Russia, its commitment to Bosnia’s territorial integrity is in the balance. Its desire to halt the advance of NATO still favours a policy of opposition to RS independence. However, Moscow’s position in the Balkans is not strong enough to determine political outcomes, but only to turn developments to its own advantage.

Accordingly, if Serbs on both sides of the river Drina make clear their intention to unite, Russia will have to make the best of that new reality and recalculate its policy towards the Serbs. That means only one thing; ensuring that, if there is to be an expanded Serbia, that Russia is the new state’s main external sponsor, to prevent it from joining NATO.

In the background to all this is Croatia, which has now adopted a revisionist position towards Bosnia and is in open dispute with the Bosniaks. The nub of the issue is Croatia’s concern that the position of the Bosnian Croats is deteriorating severely, with little chance of salvation in the form of Bosnia’s EU membership.

This has led politicians in Zagreb to push the idea of a Croat entity in Bosnia as the means for Croats there to lead a normal life, under their own leaders rather than those chosen for them by Bosniaks. Unsurprisingly, Bosniaks have pushed back against a clear threat to the integrity of the state, leading to escalating tensions between Zagreb and Sarajevo.

So far, this has not led Croatia to support Bosnia’s disintegration because Zagreb fears the consequences of instability on its border. To this end, it has opposed threats by RS to break away. The key question, however, is what Croatia would do if RS independence became a fait accompli and whether, against a backdrop of tense relations, Croatia would back the Bosniaks in a dispute with the Serbs.

In the current circumstances, that seems unlikely. Instead, the probability is that Croatia would ignore the Serbs and concentrate on protecting the Croats from the ensuing political fallout by informally separating their territory from the rest of Bosnia – as Croatia’s new President suggested in leaked comments back in 2016.

Put together, the shift in the positions of these outside powers leaves Bosnia without any external buttress, allowing the Serbs to make a renewed bid for independence.

Unlike other secessionist disputes, it does not need anyone to recognise it (although some states might) because, formally or informally, the RS will merge with Serbia. All that is required is for Serbia to accept the offer of additional territory as compensation for the loss of Kosovo – and for the Great Powers not to resist this. Once the RS leaves, Croatia will then integrate western Herzegovina into Croatia. What remains will be a new Bosniak national state, based on Sarajevo, encompassing a territory around the size of Slovenia.

Washington faces some difficult choices:

US President Donald J. Trump. Photo: EPA-EFE/HARISH TYAGI

However, it is unlikely that the US, which has reasserted its leading role in the Balkans, will passively observe a process which could easily spiral out of control. This leaves Washington with difficult choices.

The temptation will be to patch Bosnia back together with another push at Euro-Atlantic integration, renewed promises of money and pleas for reconciliation and reform. However, events have moved way beyond the point where this tried-and-failed approach might have any traction. The Serbs are on the cusp of solving their national question and will not abandon it for the sake of a few hundred million euros and empty promises of EU membership.

That leads to a second option, in which the US tries to impose a new settlement on Bosnia, designed to preserve the state a while longer. To have any purchase on the Serbs, it would have to meet their core demand for a restoration of the original Dayton agreement in which the Serbs enjoyed virtual independence, with an open border and multiple linkages between the RS and Serbia. The same would go for the Croats vis-à-vis Croatia.

However, this outcome would not resolve the Serbian national question but would simply shift its focus from Kosovo to Bosnia and prolong Serbia’s dependence on Russia. If Washington wants Belgrade to end its relationship with Moscow, it will have to drop its opposition to Serbian national unification and accommodate Serbia’s claims on the RS.

This leaves a third option, which is to accept the disintegration of Bosnia and the emergence of a Serbian national state, and steer this development towards Washington’s desired ends, probably as part of a wider reordering of the Balkans, which includes a merger of Albania and Kosovo – a process which is well underway.

In return, the US could insist that the new, enlarged Serbia drops its opposition to NATO and joins the American camp. As an offer both liberals and nationalists could accept, this would have broad support among Serbs who would readily abandon Belgrade’s relationship of convenience with Moscow for a Serbian national state, integrated with the West, in a historic sell-out of Russian interests in the region.

That would constitute a definitive victory for the US on the Balkan front, to the satisfaction of the New Cold Warriors in Washington – but the price would be the breakup of a multiethnic Bosnian state. As the contest with Russia for the control of the Balkans forces the US to ride the forces of Serbian nationalism, and as the Europeans retreat from the scene, Bosnia’s second and final collapse is surely drawing near.

Timothy Less is leading the Disintegration in Europe research project at the Centre for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy at the University of Cambridge.

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